

## EXHIBIT NO. 44

## COPIES OF DEFENSE PLANS

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## [1] EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE (1938)

## SECTION I—DIRECTIVE

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE—shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans—ORANGE, all Navy Plans—ORANGE, all Joint Plans—ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

## SECTION II—ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that—

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

[2]

## SECTION IV—MISSIONS

1. *Joint Mission for the Armed Forces.*—To defeat ORANGE by operations against ORANGE armed forces and communications, while conserving the resources of the UNITED STATES and protecting UNITED STATES' territory, sea communications, and interests.

2. *Mission for the Army.*—To defend the Continental UNITED STATES and its overseas possessions; to provide for contingencies which may arise from either foreign intervention or the ultimate exigencies of the Joint Mission, and to support the Navy.

3. *Mission for the Navy.*—To defeat ORANGE forces, interrupt ORANGE sea communications, protect UNITED STATES' sea communications and UNITED STATES' interests abroad, and to support the Army.

## SECTION V—JOINT DECISIONS

## 2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.

b. *HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier*—(1) *Boundaries.*—The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

[3] (2) *Category of Defense.*—Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

(3) *Missions*—(a) *Joint Mission.*—To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(b) *Mission for the Army.*—To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

(c) *Mission for the Navy.*—To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.

(4) *Forces*—(a) *Army Forces.*—The peace garrison, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by initial reinforcements of about 25,000 troops from Continental UNITED STATES. The reinforcements from Continental UNITED STATES will be those so designated in the Concentration Plan of the Army Strategic Plan—ORANGE.

[4] (b) *Naval Forces.*—(i) Naval Local Defense Forces of the 14th Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements to a total of about 7,000 individuals, as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE.

(ii) In time of Peace, the major part of the submarine and Naval air forces based on PEARL HARBOR will be retained in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS whenever the UNITED STATES FLEET is not in the Eastern PACIFIC.

(5) *Joint Plan to be Prepared.* Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

## SECTION VI—SUPPORTING MEASURES

## 1. TIME OF EXECUTION.

M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 1<sup>1</sup>

## SECTION VI—TASKS

*Joint Tasks*7. *Joint Task*

HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

*Joint Decisions*

a. *Boundaries.* The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

b. *Category of Defense:* Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

c. *Army Task:* To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 14 August 1939, verbally by the President 14 October 1939; revised by the Joint Board 10 April 1940.

*d. Navy Task:* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army Forces.

*f. Joint Plan to be Prepared:* Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

[2] SECTION VII—JOINT DECISIONS FOR SUPPORTING MEASURES

2. *Time of Execution.*—M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5<sup>1</sup>

SECTION VII—TASKS

*The Pacific Area*

33. *Army Tasks.*

*d.* In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

35. *Navy Tasks.*

*f.* Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

*g.* Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Samoa and Guam.

*h.* In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

47. *Categories of Defense.*

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier-----	Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier-----	Category E
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra-----	Category D
Guam-----	Category E

[2] SECTION IX.—SUPPORTING MEASURES

53. *Time of Execution.* M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

Annex I. Coastal Frontiers

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War, 2 June 1941.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint Organization and command.

"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and sub-sectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are stated below.

NOTE: The preceding subparagraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section 1, of reference (a).

"b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

[3] "c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

"d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b."

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Insert in reference (a), the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army."

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[1]

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PLAN RAINBOW No. 5<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

SECTION VII—MISSIONS AND FORCES

\* \* \* \* \*

30. *Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.*

a. *Extent.*

OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

b. Category of Defense: D (as defined in Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N., 1935).

c. *Missions.*

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.

(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

(3) Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

[2] SECTION VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS AND NAVAL SUPPORTING MEASURES

40. *General Provisions.*

a. *How put into effect.*

This plan or any portion thereof will be put into effect on orders of the War Department.

b. *Chemical Warfare.*

All necessary precautions will be made for the use of chemicals from the outbreak of hostilities; but the use of toxic agents is prohibited unless and until authorized by the War Department.

c. *Active Air Defense Measures, Continental United States.*

(1) *Responsibility*—The Chief of the Army Air Forces, under GHQ, is responsible for so much of the active air defense of the continental United States as includes planning and execution of operations of air, antiaircraft artillery, balloon barrage units and aircraft warning service, except:

(a) Local defense by ground units with their organic weapons against low-flying aircraft;

(b) When the War Department, to meet an actual or threatened invasion, activates a Theater of Operations (or similar command) in the United States or contiguous territory for the combined employment of air forces and ground arms (other than antiaircraft artillery) the commander of the theater (or similar command) will be responsible for all air defense measures in his theater.

(2) *Mission*—The air defense mission is stated in terms of priority of areas vital to national security under varying strategic conditions. Other localities or installations not named are not excluded from defense measures but are of less national importance.

(a) Condition A: No threat to vital installations on the West Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on the Atlantic Coast.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.

2d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.

3d Priority: Boston-Narragansett Area.

(b) Condition A (1): Same as A except that threat appears to be localized in North Atlantic.

Priorities as in (a) above.

[3] (c) Condition B: No threat against vital installations on the East Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on any part of Pacific Coast.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

2d Priority: Puget Sound Area.

3d Priority: San Francisco Area.

(d) Condition B (1): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in Puget Sound-San Francisco Area.

1st Priority: Puget Sound Area.

2d Priority: San Francisco Area.

3d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

(e) Condition B (2): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in San Francisco-San Diego Area.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

2d Priority: San Francisco Area.

3d Priority: Puget Sound Area.

(f) Condition C: Threat to vital installations equally divided between the East and West Coasts.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.

2d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

3d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.

4th Priority: Puget Sound Area.

5th Priority: Boston Area.

6th Priority: San Francisco Area.

(3) *Forces:*

See Sections 1 and 2, Table II, Annex II, Concentration Tables. The Chief of the Army Air Force or subordinates designated by him will exercise command functions over all mobile and fixed Aircraft Warning units in continental United States, and over such other forces as are allocated for air defense except as otherwise indicated in subparagraph (1) above.

(4) The Chief of the Army Air Force will render such assistance and advice as may be practicable to communities, installations, military or naval forces not under his command regarding weaknesses and improvements in the air raid precautions system. For this purpose he is authorized to consult directly with the authorities concerned.

*d. Logistics.*

For details relative to mobilization, concentration, embarkation, administration, military government of occupied territory, intelligence, organization, training, supply, and evacuation, see Concentration Plan and Annex III—Logistics to this Operations Plan.

## [1] EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1940

## SECTION II—BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. *a. Missions.*

(1) *Joint Mission:* To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) *Mission for the Army:* To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.

(3) *Mission for the Navy:* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces. (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Orange).

*b. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense:* Category "D" defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general reserve. (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

\* \* \* \* \*

*d. Forms of hostile attacks.* The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

(b) Sabotage.

(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

(d) Air raids, carrier based.

(e) Surface ship raids.

(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

[2] (2) *Sabotage and Internal Dissension.*

(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows:

(1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some American citizens of Japanese origin.

(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair proportion of the aliens and many citizens.

(3) Loyal to Orange (to extent of sabotage and other subversive actions). This group will probably be small, although formidable.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. *a. Basis for Planning.*(1) *Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b).

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see par. 1 a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

[3] (3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

b. *Conclusion.*—To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:*

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6).

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.

(b) *To Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:*

The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6.)

[4] (c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:*

In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

\* \* \* \* \*

[1]

Headquarters  
Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.  
11 April 1941

Headquarters  
Fourteenth Naval District.  
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.  
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. *Responsibility.* This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared, under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. *Basis.* This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that

in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. *Planning representatives.* The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3) Headquarters Hawaiian department, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. (Par. 40 a, page 61, joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.)

5. *Joint planning committee.* A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Navy District and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[2]

## SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. *Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* "The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu."

It has been determined that the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. *Hawaiian Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

8. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnson Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

9. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnston Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

10. *Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe.

(1) *Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* The Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—Hawaiian D. S. A.

(2) *Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area.* The Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area comprises: The area of water in Pearl Harbor lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in an about the entrance channel to [3] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Light, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse. This area is given the short title—Pearl D. S. A.



(3) *Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Area.* The Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Area comprises: All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from Kaoio Point, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—Kaneohe D. S. A.

(4) *Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midway, and Wake—Defensive Sea Areas.* These defensive sea areas comprise: Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.* The Defensive Coastal Area for Oahu comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

Keahi Point—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.

Puu Kapolei—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.

Kahuku Point } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.  
Puuiki Station }

This area is given the short title—Oahu D. C. A.

#### SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION—TASKS AND FORCES

12. *Category of Defense.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, Rainbow No. 1.

#### 14. *Tasks.*

a. *Joint task.* To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *Army Task.* To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *Navy task.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[4] a. *Army Forces.* The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

b. *Naval Forces.* Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

c. *Overseas Reinforcements.* (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. *Civil Organization.* A Civil Organization, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the Territory of Hawaii for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the Territory of Hawaii in assisting the military and naval forces.

#### SECTION IV—DECISIONS

#### 16. *General.*

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of Oahu in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[5] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans

for the Mobilization of man-power and material resources in the Territory of Hawaii and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. *Army.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present thereat, Honolulu Harbor, city of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks-Wheeler Field-Lualualei area. The increasing importance of the Kaneohe area is recognized.

b. An anti-aircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18 a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the Hawaiian Islands.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

[6] j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands.

k. Counter-espionage within the Hawaiian Islands.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the Hawaiian Islands.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. *Navy.* The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the Oahu-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the Oahu-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[7] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

*m.* Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

*n.* Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, dissemination of hostile information.

*o.* Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

*p.* Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

#### SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

##### 19. *Mobilization Plans.*

###### *a. General.*

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-power and material resources of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of Oahu, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

*b. Army Plans.* The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[8] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the Hawaiian Islands, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the Hawaiian Islands (civil organization (Par. 15 *d*, above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on Oahu.

*c. Navy Plans.* The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the Hawaiian Islands for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the Hawaiian Islands.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

#### SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VIII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,*

*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

(Signed) Walter C. Short,

WALTER C. SHORT,

*Lieut. General, U. S. Army,*

*Commanding, Hawaiian Department.*

[1] Headquarters  
14th Naval District,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Headquarters  
Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

#### JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT—1939

28 MARCH 1941.

#### ANNEX NO. VII, SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS—JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

##### I. General.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

##### II. Joint air operations.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make avail-

able without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks; if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

### III. Joint Communications

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense [3] Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

### IV. Joint Antiaircraft Measures.

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commanding Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*—Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*—When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,  
C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

[1]  
Comdr. Naval Base  
Defense Air Force,  
Commander Patrol Wing TWO,  
Naval Air Station,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commanding General  
Hawaiian Air Force,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT ESTIMATE COVERING JOINT ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF  
SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST OAHU OR FLEET UNITS IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA

I. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small [2] carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between

fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for [3] combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

### III. Possible enemy action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make [4] a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

### IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but

can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

[5] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carriers.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

[6] V. *Decisions:*

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility Squadrons.



2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carried VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

[7] 1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

#### MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[8] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

#### DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

\* 4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armanent and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

[9] (f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

(Signed) F. L. Martin,  
F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,  
P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

[1]

#### STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

##### HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

##### SECTION I—GENERAL

\* \* \* \* \*

5. *Tactical principles.*—\* \* \* The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

- a. Complete organization of the ground
- b. Position to be held lightly
- c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them
- d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *Security.*—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

\* \* \* \* \*

10. *Antiaircraft defense.*—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

\* \* \* \* \*

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

\* \* \* \* \*

[2]

##### SECTION III—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15f (8) below.

14. *Alert No. 1.*—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At Department Headquarters, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

\* \* \* \* \*

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

\* \* \* \* \*

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g below.

[3] g. The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

\* \* \* \* \*

i. The Station Complements of Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

\* \* \* \* \*

15. Alert No. 2.—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At Department Headquarters, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

\* \* \* \* \*

(6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

[4] (7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm. guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below.

\* \* \* \* \*

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

- (4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.
- (5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
- (6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
- (7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
- (8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
- (9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
- (10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

*f.* The Hawaiian air force will:

- (1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
- (2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
- (3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

[5] (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

- (6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
- (7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing Two.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

*g.* The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will: Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

\* \* \* \* \*

*i.* The Department Signal Officer will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

*j.* The Interceptor Command will: Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

[6] (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* Station Complements:

(1) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shafter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

\* \* \* \* \*

16. *Alert No. 3—a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

*b.* At Department Headquarters:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon \* \* \* will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon \* \* \* will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

*c.* Department Troops will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

*d.* Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on Oahu.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

\* \* \* \* \*

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

\* \* \* \* \*

[7] *e.* The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Detachment Field Artillery will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

*f.* The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On Oahu, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

[8] (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

\* \* \* \* \*

*h.* The District Commanders of Hawaii, Maui (includes Molokai) and Kauai Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

\* \* \* \* \*

*j.* The Interceptor Command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* The Department Signal Officer will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

*l.* Station Complements.—

(1) The Schofield Barracks Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shatter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Field Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

#### SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

[9] 17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

##### *a. Material Readiness.—*

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

##### *b. Degree of operational Readiness.—*

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 Minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

#### SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

##### 20. Measures to obtain information.—

##### *a. Navy.—*

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[10] (d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

##### *b. Army.*

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opaua Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lahua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loops.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

\* \* \* \* \*

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

[11] (b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

\* \* \* \* \*

c. All Elements of Hawaiian Department.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

\* \* \* \* \*

SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. *Supply.*

\* \* \* \* \*

e. Class V Supplies:

\* \* \* \* \*

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the "initial issues" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.

Antiaircraft 3", 37 mm. and Machine Gun ammunition.

Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.

Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

[12] (7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Inclosure No. 6)

[13] Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft)  
for initial issue, Hawaiian Department

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903.....	CA.....	25	140	20	185
	Eng.....		40		40
	FA.....		32	8	40
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	16	112	32	160
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	QM.....		40		40
	Sig.....		25		25
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1.....	Eng.....	48	80	24	152
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	24	162	46	232
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	Ord.....		64	16	80
	Sig.....		40		40
	MP.....		48		48
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
	CWS.....		460	120	580
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	CA.....	60	560	60	680
	FA.....	960		240	1,100
	Inf.....	60	992	120	1,172
	Ord.....		240	60	300
	QM.....	30	30	20	80
	Others.....	150	525	75	750
	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf.....	500	3,500	1,000	5,000
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4).	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	4,800		1,200	6,000
	CA.....	7,200		1,800	9,000
	(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.).....	3,600		900	4,500
	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf.....	675	4,725	2,350	6,750
	Others.....	600	2,100	300	3,000
	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf.....		28		28
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.....		21		21
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	Sig. (motorcycles).....		340		340
	Sig (other than motorcycles).....		350		250
	MP.....		440	110	550
	Others.....		240	60	300
[14]					
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA).	CA (AW Bn.).....	5,760		1,440	7,200
	CA (except AW Bn.).....	2,880		720	3,600
	Others.....	2,880		720	3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	FA.....	600		150	750
	Inf.....	960		240	1,200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	1,568		392	1,900



[15] Weapon	Arm or Service	No. of rds. per weapon				
		AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Shotgun	All					25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)	Inf.					150
Signals, ground (asstd.)	Inf.					25
	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.)					5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.)					30
Lights, Very signal (assorted)	All					24
37mm gun, M1916					240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3)	FA	200				200
	Inf.	180			20	200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft	CA	180			1,620	1,800
60mm Mortar	Inf.				120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar	Inf.			(light)	132	150
				(heavy)	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D	All					<sup>1</sup> 459
75mm gun, Antitank	FA					<sup>1</sup> 144
105mm How	FA					<sup>1</sup> 205
155mm How	FA					<sup>1</sup> 117
3" AA mobile	CA	15			285	300
90mm AA mobile	CA	12			238	250
3" AA fixed	CA				300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1	All				100	100
240mm How. M1918	FA				60	60
8" Ry. Gun	CA	85				85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY						
3" gun, M1903					505	505
6" gun		1,000				1,000
8" gun		350			200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)		335				335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)		275				275
12" Mortar		300				300
14" gun		280				280
16" gun		250				250

## NOTES

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

<sup>1</sup> Proportions of types (shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

(Inclosure No. 7)

[16] Unit of fire (other than aircraft)—Hawaiian Department

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				Total
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903.....	30	105	15	-----	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	150	525	75	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle).....	150	525	75	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle).....	600	-----	150	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1).....	600	2,100	300	-----	3,000
Pistol, cal. .45.....	-----	20	-----	-----	20
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	-----	160	40	-----	200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	720	-----	180	-----	900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries).....	1,920	-----	480	-----	2,400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries).....	960	-----	240	-----	1,200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....	-----	-----	-----	-----	150
Projector, signal ground (assorted).....	-----	-----	-----	-----	25
Pistol, Very, Mk III.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	24
37mm gun, M1916.....	-----	-----	-----	120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3.....	84	-----	-----	36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft.....	60	-----	-----	540	600
60mm Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	400	400
81mm Mortar.....	-----	-----	(Light)	234	300
3'' Trench Mortar.....	-----	-----	(Heavy)	66	-----
75mm Field Gun.....	-----	-----	(Super)	36	300
-----	-----	-----	(Normal)	150	-----
-----	-----	-----	(Reduced)	114	-----
75mm gun, antitank.....	111	-----	-----	39	150
105mm How.....	-----	-----	-----	225	225
155mm How. M1918.....	-----	-----	-----	150	150
3'' AA gun, mobile.....	15	-----	-----	285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile.....	12	-----	-----	238	250
3'' AA gun, fixed.....	-----	-----	-----	300	300
155mm gun, M1918 M1.....	112	-----	-----	38	150
240mm How. M1918.....	-----	-----	-----	60	60
8'' Ry Gun.....	85	-----	-----	-----	85
4'' Chemical Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	200
4.2'' Chemical Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	200

## Notes

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.  
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

[17]

(Inclosure No. 8)

## Load of aircraft ammunition per airplane

Item	Type Airplane						
	Bombers			Pursuit			OBS. (C&D)
	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	
Ctg. AP Cal 30.....							
Ctg. ball Cal 30.....	480	1,280	1,920	1,600	400	800	640
Ctg. tr Cal 30.....	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#.....	600	1,600	2,400	2,000	500	1,000	800
Ctg. AP Cal 50.....	60			20	10		
Ctg. ball Cal 50.....	900			300	150		
Ctg. tr Cal 50.....	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#.....	1,200			400	200		
<b>BOMBERS</b>							
Bomb frag. 30#.....			40			10	
and Bomb Demo. 100#.....	20	32	12				
or Bomb Demo. 300#.....	14	14	4				
or Bomb Demo. 500-600#.....	8	6	2				
or Bomb Demo. 1000-1100#.....	6	4	1				
or Bomb Demo. 2000#.....	4	2					
<b>PYROTECHNICS</b>							
Bomb Photoflash.....	14	14					14
Flare M26 <sup>1</sup> .....	3	3	1				1
Flare M 9.....	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd.....	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift.....	10	7					

<sup>1</sup> For Reconnaissance squadrons only.<sup>2</sup> Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

[1]

## OPERATIONS ORDERS

## HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## PART VI—FIELD ORDER NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)

Field Orders No.—Ins

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.(Date)<sup>1</sup>(Hour)<sup>1</sup>

Maps: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition); Terrain Map, Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition); Island of Oahu 1/180,000 (1939 Edition); Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102.

1. a. (1) For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of Intelligence.

(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.

<sup>1</sup> Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders from this headquarters. See also par. 3 c (6) (Page 3).

b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:

(1) By the Pacific Fleet:

(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.

(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.

(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit to locate and destroy hostile submarines.

(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the anti-aircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached units):

[2] (a) Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily mine sweeping operation.

(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing Two, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.

(c) Establishment of a harbor control post.

(d) The placing under the tactical control of the Army of certain land based fighter aircraft and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery units.

2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.

3. a. The Hawaiian Division will provide protection for vital installations on Oahu, except those located within Police District No. 1, against acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers, will maintain one infantry battalion with necessary motor transportation in readiness at Schofield Barracks prepared to move on two hours notice, and will maintain normal training activities with the remainder of the command.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by such Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery units as may be made available, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, paying particular attention to the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area, and in addition thereto, will—

(1) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(2) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air Forces in safe guarding friendly aircraft from the fire of anti-aircraft artillery troops.

(3) Arrange for such coordination of the anti-aircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army anti-aircraft artillery defense as may be practicable. This coordination will include measures to protect friendly aircraft from the anti-aircraft artillery fire of Naval ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(4) Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, disseminate warnings of hostile air attacks by radio broadcast.

(5) Unless specifically authorized, railway guns will not be moved from the home stations of the units manning this armament.

[3] c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:

(1) *Offensive Action.* Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.

(2) *Defensive Action.* Reinforced by shore based fighter aircraft of the Navy made available, defend Oahu against air attack. Provide anti-aircraft machine gun defense for airplanes on ground on all fields.

(3) *Reconnaissance.* Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.

(4) *Cooperation.* In the preparations for and conduct of joint air operations, close cooperation will be maintained with the commanders of local Navy air units. Close cooperation will also be maintained with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade to provide for safeguarding Army and Navy aircraft from the fire of friendly anti-aircraft artillery.

(5) *Conditions of Readiness.* Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.

(6) *Hostile Air Attack.* Air operations directed above will be instituted without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon Oahu or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.

*d.* The Department Signal Officer, in cooperation with Naval communications personnel will insure that, insofar as equipment available permits, the joint communications described in Section III of Annex No. VII, HCF-39 are in readiness for immediate employment at any time that they may be required.

*e.* The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Be prepared to initiate such precautionary measures as may be required by the situation to insure protection of vital installations within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army and Navy reservations. These precautionary measures will be limited to the minimum necessary in order to avoid undue alarm and hysteria of the civil population.

[4] (2) Maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine any indications of the possibility of sabotage by hostile sympathizers.

*f.* The Commanding Officers, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department Service Command will maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine indications of the possibility of sabotage or attacks by hostile sympathizers, take such precautionary steps as may be required by the situation within the means available to them, and when necessary, secure the cooperation of civilian agencies in the guarding of military airfields.

*w.* (1) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval District and elements of the Pacific Fleet in all spheres of action compatible with their missions, armament, and equipment.

(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under the following conditions:

(a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines or other ammunition, has been observed.

(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.

(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.

(3) Instructions will be issued to all sentinel and patrols guarding vital installations requiring that ammunition will be used only after all other measures have been employed, without success.

(4) During periods when elements of the command are alerted under the provisions of this order, normal training will be continued to the extent practicable.

4. *a.* Small arms and artillery ammunition issued to troops initially will not exceed approximately one-half day of fire. Provision will be made for prompt issue of additional quantities of ammunition. Stocks of aircraft ammunition and bombs will be maintained at airfields in accordance with existing policies.

*b.* Other administrative details normal.

5. Command Posts:

Hawaiian Department: Fort Shafter.

Hawaiian Division: Schofield Barracks.

[5] Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Fort DeRussy.

Hawaiian Air Force: Fort Shafter.

Fourteenth Naval District: Pearl Harbor.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

(S) Philip Hayes

PHILIP HAYES,

Colonel, General Staff Corps,

Chief of Staff.

Official:

(S) R. C. Throckmorton

R. C. THROCKMORTON,

Lieut. Colonel, General Staff Corps,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

[6] Distribution:

Distributed as a component part of "Army Operating Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1938"

\* \* \* \* \*

[1] EXTRACTS FROM NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5

## PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

## CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

## SECTION 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

\* \* \* \* \*

3233. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the Pacific Area are assigned the following tasks:

(a) *Task.*

Defend the Naval Coastal Frontiers in categories indicated below:

\* \* \* \* \*

Category D. \* \* \*

—The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier

\* \* \* \* \*

## APPENDIX I—ANNEX 1. COASTAL FRONTIERS

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Insert in reference (a) (Joint action of the Army and Navy, 1935) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

(a) Boundaries.

"The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for its defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston's Reef and Palmyra Islands and Kingman's Reef.

[2] "(b) Commanders.

"Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

"Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12/  
A4-3 QL/(13)  
Serial 01646

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

## PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 2CL-41 (REVISED)

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To : Pacific Fleet

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. Itr. file A7-2 (13) Serial 01221 of 3 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L 40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sector.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.  
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,  
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,  
(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

[2] (A) *Continuous Patrol:*

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *Intermittent Patrols:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol:

(a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-21' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) *Sortie and Entry:*

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A."

[3] (4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

- (b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.
- (c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.
- (d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.
- (e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

*(D) Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

[4] (6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

*(E) Ships at Sea:*

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(2) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to cooperate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.



(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness Three on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(h) Maintenance of material condition X-ray, or equivalent to all ships.

[5] (i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

*(F) Ships in Port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

*(G) Defense Against Air Attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

[6] (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Feet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

CONDITION I.—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION II.—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION III.—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

[7] (b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c) above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

*Ship Attacked.*

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A. Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

*Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

[8] (d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which

assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minicraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea*. Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation [9] and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A. X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NYS-10,  
(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary,*

USS Penn.—75—10—15—41—1,000.



Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[1] File

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)

Confidential

Operation Plan No. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS,  
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 27 February 1941.

**TASK ORGANIZATION**

(a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)

*Destroyer Patrol* (2 DD)

• Outer—1 DD

Inner—1 DD

Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)

Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)

A/B Boom

Mine Sweepers—Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86) Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)

(b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commander Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction with Army.

(c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer) In conjunction with Army.

(d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with Army.

1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

*Assumptions.*

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
- (2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.
- (3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
- (b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
  - (1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.
  - (2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.
  - [2] (3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the Interior Waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "B".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense:* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

[3] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E".
- (2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.
- (3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH,  
Naval Base Defense Officer,  
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).

**Annexes:**

- A. Inshore Patrol Plan
- B. Base Defense Air Force Plan
- C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan
- D. Harbor Control Post Plan
- E. Communication Plan.

Distribution-complete with Annexes.

CinCPAC (10)	COMSCOFOR (15)
CG HD (20)	Combat ships (17)
Dist. Marine Officer 14ND	COMCRUBATFOR (25)
Operations Officer 14ND	COMAIRBATFOR (50)
Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND	COMDESBATFOR (165)
Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL	COMIXBATFOR (20)
District Intelligence Officer 14ND	COMCRUSCOFOR (25)
NTS 14ND (10)	COMSUBSCOFOR (40)
CO NAS PHTH (5)	COMPATWINGTWO (20)
CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)	COMBASEFOR (75)
COMAIRSCOFOR (3)	COMDR. 2ND. MAR. AIR CRP (10)
CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)	COMDESDIVTWO (05)
COMBATFOR (15)	

[1] File -A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0563)

*Confidential*

ANNEX "A" REVISED TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN No. 1-41

Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A-1-41

HEADQUARTERS,  
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol*: Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line*: Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol*: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEY.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer*: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combase.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(2) *East Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(4) *West Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(d) *A/B Boom*: Lieut. Spear.

Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft*:

(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Cmdr. C. D. Kine, D-O, USNR REEDBIRD, CON-DOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBELL.

(2) YS-86; C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANOU, and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1-41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)," are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*."

"The *OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (Oahu D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:—

KEAHI POINT-----	Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI-----	Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION-----	} Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards."
KAHUKU POINT-----	

"The Outer Harbor Area is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries." (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONOLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"The Harbor Channel Area is the water area which lies between the Outer Harbor Area and the Inner Harbor Area, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

"The Inner Harbor Area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor."

[3] This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2760 2690 kcs. (2792 in peace time). Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered. (Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness: Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) A/B Boom to be maintained and operated at present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(e) *Minecraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operation, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, "Clear" to mean



"The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed."

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of available vessels:

(a) (1) *Picket Line*.

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol*.

(2) The following task group under Task Organization, will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6-40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) Inn Harbor Patrol

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base defense

Communication Plan, Annex E.

Use zone time plus ten and one half.

Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ G. B. Woolley

G. B. WOOLLEY,

Commander, U. S. N. (Ret).,

Commander Inshore Patrol,

Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ J. W. Bays

J. W. BAYS,

Aide to Commandant.

Distribution:

Same as Basic Plan.

[1] -C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,  
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941—NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.

Shore-based VO—VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air.

Combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

#### 1. Information:

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and

attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,*  
*Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,*  
*(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).*

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,*  
*Commander Naval Base Defense Force.*

Authenticated:

[Signature illegible]

*Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

[1] C-A16-3/4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commander Naval Base  
Defense Air Force,  
Patrol Wing Two,  
Naval Air Station  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General,  
Hawaiian Air Force,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADDENDUM 1 TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

## II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU, as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

## III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second

attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing condi- [4] tions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

#### IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt despatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

#### V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army Bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

- (a) An air attack occurs on OAHU
- (b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.
- (c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

#### MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routing operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

#### DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.

In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Authenticated:

/s/ J. W. HAYES,  
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

*Confidential*

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,  
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41—  
CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND READINESS REPORTS

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

## DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

[2] 3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

## ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

*Task Organizations:*

(a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.

(b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.

1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1-41 and OCABF-38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".

2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defence of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive:* Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) *Group Five:* Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five:* Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five:* Command Post: To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.  
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Army,

Commander Naval Base Defense Force,

(Commandant, 14th Naval District).

[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0164)

*Confidential*

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Washington, December 5, 1941.

Operation Plan No. 1-41

ANNEX "D"

*Task Organization*

(a) Harbor Control Post District Operations Officer.

1. *Information.* As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army Circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Any observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Harbor Control Post.*

(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

Harbor Control Post to  
Hdqtrs. Haw'n Dept. Ft. Shafter  
Hdqtrs. HSCAB, Ft. Derussy  
Command Post, Ft. Kamehameha  
Command Post, Hickam Field  
Commander Patrol Wing Two  
SOPE (if at dock)  
Navy Yard Signal Tower  
Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E," and be prepared to direct Power House as to Signal to be used (See paragraph 6,000, *Special Signals.*)

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I: Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.



Condition II: Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

Note: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III: Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508; after working hours on Honolulu 75143.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ H. B. KNOWLES  
H. B. KNOWLES  
Commander, U. S. Navy  
District Operations Officer

Approved:

/s/ C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH  
Naval Base Defense Officer  
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)

Distribution: In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1-41

## EXHIBIT NO. 45

November 27, 1941.

(Stamped notation:) Nov 28, 1941. Noted—Chief of Staff.

(WBS—handwritten). Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff.

(WBS—handwritten).

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Hayden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hall and the President this morning. Mr. Hall stated the conversations had been terminated with the latest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

(Signed) L. T. GEROV  
L. T. GEROW,  
Brigadier General,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:

Memo. for President, 11-27-41

Memo. for TAG, 11-27-41